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New York’s Two Sandys
Daniel Aldana Cohen, Max Liboiron1

According to New Yorkers, two different Hurricane Sandys hit their city in 2012. The first was a
one-time indiscriminate exceptional catastrophe. The second was an extraordinary acceleration of
inequalities affecting the poorest New Yorkers. Daniel A. Cohen and Max Liboiron promote the
second perspective as a systemic approach susceptible of helping New York City face the challenges
of environmental distress both locally and globally.
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy flooded New York City’s streets, subterranean transit
system, and 90,000 homes and businesses. Forty-three people died, 6,500 were evacuated from
nursing homes, and nearly 2 million lost power. Gasoline shortages paralyzed vehicle traffic (City
of New York 2013). New Yorkers were not affected equally, and these inequalities have deepened
during the ongoing recovery and reconstruction.
The Two Sandys framework: a disruptive event vs. an exacerbation of systemic inequalities
Through our work with the Superstorm Research Lab, we have found that responses to the storm
can be sorted into two groups, which we term a Two Sandys framework (Superstorm Research Lab
2013). This framework identifies two distinct ways of understanding the storm that translate into
particular sets of concerns, priorities, and actions.2
The first way of understanding Sandy is as an acute, disruptive event. This perspective is most
common among governing and elite institutions such as large NGOs and foundations, the entities
that exercise the major share of authority and influence at the municipal and state levels. It
understands Sandy as a severe, but relatively short-term, interruption of normal city functions and
focuses largely on physical infrastructure. The recovery goals inherent in this frame have been to
repair interruptions to the pre-storm status quo of New York City as a stable, global cultural and
economic center as quickly as possible, with a significant focus on strengthening infrastructure.
The second way of understanding the storm, most common among community groups and
grassroots political networks, is that Sandy sharpened and exacerbated systemic problems. This
perspective sees Sandy’s impact as intensifying an ongoing crisis stemming from social and
economic inequality. The recovery goals inherent in this frame are focused on pairing shorter-term
triage with longer-term transformations of the underlying sources of vulnerability and economic
insecurity, namely inadequate housing, precarious employment, and inaccessible essential services.
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Our findings are based on collaborative efforts of the Superstorm Research Lab to conduct nearly 80 interviews with
actors in local and state governments, a range of civil society groups, volunteer first responders, and ordinary New
Yorkers hit hardest by the storm. We also draw on ethnographic fieldwork, document analysis, and collaborative
research with scholars and community organizations.
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Two concepts of crisis, two modes of response
The different concepts of crisis we term the Two Sandys have led to different types of responses.
New York City’s mayoral After Action Report (2011), for instance, identifies problems beginning
days before the storm that could be addressed by technical fixes in the near future, including
evacuation orders, gasoline shortages, and power outages (Gibbs and Holloway 2013). City and
state governments have devoted substantial planning efforts to long-term reconstruction after Sandy,
the bulk of which initially focused on returning to and safeguarding—rather than changing—the
social and economic status quo. Both of these examples are characteristic of the first perspective on
Sandy.
Meanwhile, grassroots and community-based organizations (CBOs) have focused more on how
the storm has exacerbated vulnerability via a deepening of income insecurity, insufficient access to
education, unaffordable housing, and widespread debt. For many communities, “back to normal”
does not mean recovery, but a return to vulnerability. Thus, organizations like Alliance for a Just
Rebuilding—a coalition of faith groups, labor unions, community groups, and environmental
organizations—explicitly point to the need for good jobs, affordable housing, renewable energy,
accessible health care, and community consultation for recovery plans (Alliance for a Just
Rebuilding 2013).
Inequality and crisis exacerbated—the case of housing
Housing provides perhaps the most telling example of Sandy’s effect on existing inequalities, as
well as the ways in which the city’s response has ended up prolonging chronic crisis. The storm
destroyed or damaged 305,000 housing units in New York City. Poor and working class
New Yorkers, especially tenants, immigrants, and people of color, have struggled disproportionately
to repair their homes, echoing trends documented in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in
New Orleans (Merdjanoff 2013). A report from Alliance for a Just Rebuilding found that lowerincome homeowners are getting virtually no government funding, despite over $3 billion in federal
aid to the city for disaster recovery (Alliance for a Just Rebuilding 2014). Municipal documents
reveal that only 110 of 19,920 registrants for the Build it Back program, or 0.55%, have been
awarded a grant so far, and in January 2014—more than two years after the storm—construction
had not begun on a single house.3 Since then, however, mayor Bill de Blasio’s administration has
slowly managed to accelerate the rebuilding process (Buettner and Chen 2014).
In the case of public housing, more than 80,000 New Yorkers living in over 400 New York City
Housing Authority (NYCHA) buildings lost key services like electricity and elevators when the
storm struck. According to a survey of nearly 500 NYCHA residents, 55% had repair needs in their
dwellings before Sandy, 40% developed new needs because of Sandy, and 62% were told they
would have to wait six months or more for repairs. The table below shows, for example, how Sandy
worsened widespread preexisting mold contamination (Alliance for a Just Rebuilding et al. 2014).
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Ibid. and the City of New York’s Sandy Funding Tracker website (URL: www1.nyc.gov/sandytracker).
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The Two Sandys framework illustrates the distinct ways that New Yorkers understood Hurricane
Sandy—understandings that form the basis for subsequent actions. But the Two Sandys framework
also points to a more systemic approach, which understands environmental disasters as both
sharpening (in the short term) and exacerbating (over a longer stretch) preexisting inequalities not
only locally but also on a more global scale.
Addressing systemic inequalities: long-term, local, and global
Locally, in New York City, community groups that have poured research and organizing
resources into housing advocacy played an instrumental role in electing New York’s new mayor,
Bill de Blasio. The new city government has shown much more interest than the previous
administration in the intersection between Sandy recovery, long-term disaster preparedness, and
equal access to housing (Beck 2014). Elections matter. Even so, it remains too soon to say whether
the de Blasio administration will succeed in implementing the real, lasting improvements to the
economic and social security of lower-income New Yorkers that the administration says are now a
priority.
More globally, while we focus on the Two Sandys in New York City, there was also yet another
Hurricane Sandy, which hit Haiti and other coastal countries before making landfall in the United
States. Haiti’s Sandy killed 52 people, flooded most of the south end of the country, and displaced
tens of thousands of families, adding to the 400,000 people that were already displaced and living in
camps after the 2010 earthquake and the 7,500 Haitians killed by the 2010–2013 cholera epidemic
(Rosen 2012). In large part thanks to climate change, for Haiti, New York, and most of the world,
regular disasters are the new normal.
3

A just response to extreme weather, at the global scale and in the long run, means that New York
must do more to pioneer a socially equitable form of low-carbon urbanism. It is imperative that
long-term social and economic justice work be clearly connected to efforts to reduce greenhousegas emissions—which are on track to cause many more Sandys, especially devastating to places
like Haiti (and the Philippines, and Somalia, etc.). Directly and indirectly, wealthy New York firms
and individuals bear disproportionate responsibility for climate change, but remain relatively
insulated from its effects (Cohen 2014).4 This call dovetails with wider efforts in disaster research
and politics to push for expanding definitions of disaster to include long-term, chronic, slowmoving crises with a focus on populations that shoulder the brunt of everyday pollution, the effects
of climate change, and environmental illness, among other systemic traumas.
Disasters don’t just leave infrastructure in rubble. They also illuminate the moments when our
usual forms of intervention fail to address a devastating problem. New systems, communities, and
policies must emerge as the old systems are overwhelmed by social and physical change. Within
this paradigm, the systemic inequities that Sandy laid bare occurred long before the hurricane hit.
The goal of our Two Sandys framework is to direct the focus of policymakers and other decisionmakers to the systemic social crises that extreme weather sharpens and exacerbates.
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